1. for all x if x has conceivable existence and x has exclusive existence in the understanding then x has conceivable existence in reality 2. for all x if x has exclusive existence in the understanding then x has conceivable existence 3. for all x if x has conceivable existence in reality then x admits of ontological perfectibility 4. for all x either x has exclusive existence in the understanding or x has actual existence c. God exists let: əUx=x has exclusive existence in the understanding @E!x=x has actual existence ©E!x=x has conceivable existence ©Rx=x has conceivable existence in reality Ix=x is ontologically imperfectible the definite description God g=(℩x)(Ix) proof: 1. (∀x) (©E!x ∧ əUx)⊃©Rx. premise 2. (∀x) əUx⊃©E!x. premise 3. (∀x ) ©Rx.⊃~Ix. premise 4. (∀x )əUx ⊕ @E!x. premise 5. əUg⊃©E!g. 2UI 6. əUg. ...
Existential Inertia in general is the metaphysical thesis which claims that a concrete contingent object once in existence will persist in existence until its' existence is destroyed or impugned by an external cause. Recently, Existential Inertia thesis has been modified by some of its pundits to admit the causal interplay of ontologically necessary primitives or an ontologically necessary primitive which would be both nomically necessary and metaphysically necessary, and would through its own existential inertia support the temporal existence of any causally contingent agent. This article will present four arguments against EIT(existential inertia thesis) thereby revealing the metaphysical and ontological inconsistencies of the existential inertist's claims. Argument 1: Diachronic Identity Since, the EIT pundit must rely on natural causal closure or an ontic structural realist ontology to appeal to identity preservation over time then it would seem that such ...